The report investigates Alkagesta Ltd, a Malta-based firm, alleged in several sources to be transporting oil with disputed origin documentation.

While Turkmenistan’s crude oil exports are officially moved via the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline through SOCAR Trading under recognized agreements, there are allegations that Alkagesta has been involved in transporting oil of Libyan and Russian origin described as Turkmen oil into Turkey and Europe.

This is according to an investigation by the publication «Euasia.news».

Official Oil Export Routes from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan

Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have established legal and transparent mechanisms for exporting crude oil:

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• Via the Caspian Sea: Oil is shipped by tankers to Baku.
• BTC Pipeline: SOCAR Trading, through an official tender, transports Turkmen and Kazakh oil through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline to the Mediterranean (Ceyhan, Turkey).
• These exports are backed by state-level agreements and supported by Azerbaijani state media reports, confirming SOCAR’s role in facilitating these flows.

This system ensures millions of barrels of crude are delivered securely and transparently to global markets.

Alkagesta’s Alleged Activities

• Various reports have connected Alkagesta Ltd to:
• The transport of Libyan oil, including from Benghazi, with claims of links to groups such as the LAAF and Wagner Group.
• The use of disputed Turkmenorigincertificates for oilshipments into Turkey via Malta.
• Operations involving tankers such as MT Tony and MT Istra.

Evidence from Bloomberg, Lloyd’s List, UN reports, and EU investigations highlights Malta as a hub for this illicit activity. Documents show clear contradictions in origin claims: declared as Turkmen oil, but actually loaded in Malta or Libya.

The Role of Adnan Ahmadzade

Allegations have been made that behind Alkagesta’s operations is Adnan Ahmadzade, former head of SOCAR’s marketing division. Ahmadzade, a UK and Azerbaijani citizen, is not listed in Alkagesta’s formal registration; however, some industry sources claim he may have significant influence over the company.

It has been reported that the current CEO of Alkagesta, Kamran Aghayev, is a relative of Adnan Ahmadzade, which some sources suggest could indicate a closer connection between the company’s activities and Ahmadzade. Given Ahmadzade’s past role in SOCAR’s marketing operations and his knowledge of regional oil logistics, these reports raise concerns about potential conflicts of interest and governance.

Many experts and observers believe that this matter should be thoroughly examined by UK authorities, European Union regulators, and relevant international oversight bodies, as it is seen to potentially undermine sanctions enforcement, energy security, and market integrity.

The Emergence of Alkagesta and Its Rapid Expansion into Contested Oil Trades”

The suspicious nature of Alkagesta becomes clear when analyzing its history:

• The company was incorporated in Malta in 2018, and almost immediately engaged in high-volume, high-risk oil trades.
• Alkagesta has been officially accused by Albanian authorities of smuggling 22,500 tons of Russian oil into Albania. It also attempted to move Russian-origin diesel into Spain, an effort that was intercepted and prevented. These accusations demonstrate a clear pattern of sanctions evasion and illicit trade.

According to the “ALB UK News” report, Alkagesta (a Malta-registered company linked to Socar Trading and Maddox) was involved in bypassing the embargo on Russian oil and secretly channeling it into Europe

Albanian Police Intercept Oil Smuggling Operation Linked to Russia and Azerbaijan

In February 2023, Albanian authorities intercepted 22,500 tons of oil at the Port of Durrës. Initial reports described the shipment as Libyan-flagged, yet official documents, satellite tracking, and investigative reporting reveal that the cargo originated from Novorossiysk, Russia.

During the investigation, authorities confirmed that the tanker’s captain is a Russian national, Alexey Smaznov. Captain Smaznov told investigators that he works on a vessel owned by a Libyan company (though the ship sails under the Liberian flag). He was able to provide a convincing explanation regarding the delivery address of the cargo and the lack of a certificate of origin for the shipment. The captain stated that he was merely the transporter and added that the oil product on board had been ordered by some Albanian and Maltese companies.

Subsequently, police identified the client company as AV International Group, owned by Piro Bare, who is involved in the hydrocarbons business, and managed by Orledia Bare. Orledia Bare, as previously mentioned, serves as one of the company’s managers. Based on this information, Durres authorities contacted businessman Piro Bare and visited the AV International Group office.

Piro Bare explained to police that he was negotiating with companies from Malta and the United Arab Emirates to purchase a certain amount of oil for delivery to Albania. He stated that the company he had ordered from and exchanged several emails with is called Ses Dmch Group. According to Bare, the oil was sourced from Russia, but the company’s documents falsely indicated Libya as the country of origin.

The sequence of events leading up to the police operation was as follows: when the vessel entered the Adriatic Sea, Piro Bare submitted documents to the Durres port customs for unloading the cargo into containers at Albania’s Porto Romano. Due to document issues, Bare could not clear customs and decided to cancel the delivery because of the complicated procedures at Durres port. Meanwhile, the tanker, suspected of originating from Russia, remained at sea and was subsequently seized.

Further details clarify the origin of the tanker FIDAN, allegedly arriving from Azerbaijan. According to Albanian police, the FIDAN (IMO: 9423736) is a chemical tanker built in 2009, currently sailing under the Turkish flag. Officials note that the executives of Alkagesta Ltd, OilMar DMCC,Socar Trading, involved in the operation, are all from Azerbaijan.

It was reported that the cargo was delivered to a Greek port by the FIDAN, which had been loaded on January 20 in the Russian port of Novorossiysk. This information aligns with data released by a cargo and vessel-tracking center.

The Durres prosecutor’s office states that the ship was managed by an Azerbaijani company and that the oil had been loaded from the Russian port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea. Albanian media have expressed surprise that Azerbaijan was mentioned in such a controversial operation

According to the Albanian Police report, the operation involved the Economic and Financial Crime Unit in Durres, which had received information about a Liberian-flagged vessel involved in smuggling a large quantity of oil.

Based on this intelligence, authorities organized a police operation, codenamed “Embargo”, preventing the vessel from transporting oil to Albania using forged documents. The shipment was suspected to originate from countries under oil embargo, specifically Russia via the port of Novorossiysk. 

The operation involved sophisticated ship-to-ship (STS) transfers in Greek territorial waters, falsification of certificates of origin, and coordination among multiple offshore companies.

The companies identified in these operations include Oilmar Shipping DMCC (Dubai), Alkagesta (Malta), Almedia (Turkey), and allegedly SOCAR Trading . These actors are implicated in transporting Russian-origin oil to European markets while circumventing UN and EU sanctions

• The article published on albuktv.com mentions the name of Oilmar Shipping DMCC. The article states that this company, along with Alkagesta (Malta) and Almedia (Turkey), is part of a group of companies controlled by SOCAR Trading . The purpose of these structures is to transport Russian oil to Albania, evading sanctions. The article also states that these companies are registered in the Porto Romano free economic zone and have signed a storage agreement in Tirana, obtaining a customs code
• Yusif Mammadov is the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Oilmar Shipping and Chartering DMCC, a Dubai-based company specializing in marine fuels trading and petroleum products chartering. Under his leadership, Oilmar has expanded its operations globally, providing services in over 60 countries .
• Position: CEO at Oilmar Shipping and Chartering DMCC.
• Industry: Marine fuels trading and petroleum products chartering.
• Company Establishment: Oilmar DMCC was established in November 2015.
• Global Presence: The company operates in more than 60 countries worldwide.
• Revenue Milestone: In 2022, Oilmar’s team achieved a gross revenue exceeding USD 1 billion for the first time

Another nuance is that one of the former directors of SOCAR Trading SA, Maryam Almaszade, also has a stake in another company, Dilara Mirzajanova. Another company of Adnan Ahmadzadeh is in Spain.

• The company’s structure also shows notable connections. Before these reported issues, Alkagesta’s corporate records list Kamran Agayev, who is reported by some sources to be a cousin of Adnan Ahmadzade, as CEO. Agayev is also listed as the founder, Director, and Authorized Signatory of Caspian Oil and Gas Co. Ltd, registered on 23 May 2019, with Alkagesta Holding Co Ltd noted as a shareholder.”
• Caspian Oil and Gas Co. Ltd operates within the Caspian Oil Group, which maintains offices not only in Azerbaijan and the UAE but also in Moscow, Russia (Presnenskaya Naberezhnaya), as well as Turkey, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and South Korea.

Russian Connections: Tatneft and Sibur

On its own corporate website (caspianasoil.com), Caspian Oil & Gas lists its strategic partners as Tatneft and Sibur:

• Tatneft: one of Russia’s largest vertically integrated oil companies, headquartered in Tatarstan.
• Sibur: Russia’s largest petrochemical company, deeply tied to the Russian energy sector and sanctioned financial flows.

These connections establish that Alkagesta and its affiliated companies are not only tied to sanctioned oil smuggling networks but also maintain direct business partnerships with Russia’s major energy conglomerates. This makes Alkagesta a critical player in enabling Russia’s continued access to global markets despite international sanctions.

Why This Matters

• Sanctions Evasion: Falsifying certificates of origin enables sanctioned oil (Libyan, Russian) to enter international markets disguised as Turkmen.
• Geopolitical Risk: Strengthens illicit networks controlled by militias and sanctioned entities, including the Wagner Group.
• Market Manipulation: Undermines legitimate trade routes like BTC, harming transparency and trust in global energy markets.
• Russian Influence: Partnerships with Tatneft and Sibur reveal Alkagesta’s role in shielding Russian petrochemical and oil products from sanctions.

Conclusion

Turkmen and Kazakh oil already flow transparently through the BTC pipeline to Turkey and global markets under SOCAR’s oversight. The existence of companies like Alkagesta, allegedly controlled by former SOCAR executive Adnan Ahmadzade and directly connected to Russian energy giants, points to deliberate fraud, sanctions evasion, and abuse of international trade systems.

According to a report published by the Romanian news outlet Libertatea.

Companies that benefit from the conflict in Ukraine. How Romania became Kiev’s second-largest diesel exporter

WHY ALKAGESTA APPEARED IN THE LIBERTATEA ARTICLE:

1. NaftoRynok Data – Primary Reason:

Alkagesta came to Libertatea’s attention through the NaftoRynok consulting firm’s report. In this report, Alkagesta was listed as “a company exporting diesel to Ukraine”.

Quote from the article: “Alkagesta appears in turn in the data from consulting firm NaftoRynok as exporting to Ukraine”

2. Oil Terminal’s Client List:

Alkagesta is on Oil Terminal’s official client list. Oil Terminal company provided Libertatea with a complete list of all its clients:

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On the list:

• Petrom
• Oscar Downstream
• Petrotel Lukoil
• Vitol
• SOCAR Petroleum
• Alkagesta LTD 
• MOL Romania
• Chimcomplex Borzesti

3. “Malta’s Largest Company” Status:

Libertatea presents Alkagesta as “cea mai mare companie din Malta” (Malta’s largest company). This emphasizes the company’s significance.

4. Role in Romania-Ukraine Fuel Supply Route:

The article discusses Romania’s rise to second place in diesel exports to Ukraine. In this context:

5. International Trader Status:

Alkagesta is mentioned alongside major international traders like Vitol and Euronova Energies. This shows the company’s significance in terms of volume.

6. “Silence Strategy” – Creating Suspicion:

Alkagesta’s failure to respond to Libertatea’s questions made the company appear more suspicious and caused it to be specifically highlighted in the article.

TIMELINE OF ALKAGESTA’S APPEARANCE IN THE ARTICLE:

2022-2024:

• Major increase in Romania’s diesel exports to Ukraine
• Alkagesta’s name appears in NaftoRynok reports
• Listed among Oil Terminal clients

October 2024:

• Libertatea investigation begins
• Questions sent to Alkagesta
• Company fails to respond

October 10, 2024:

• Article published
• Alkagesta listed among “non-responding companies”

HOW IT ATTRACTED SO MUCH ATTENTION:

1. Volume – Listed as major trader in NaftoRynok data
2. Location – Malta registration (offshore characteristics)
3. Connections – Oil Terminal client
4. Transparency – Leaving questions unanswered
5. Timing – Active actions in times of conflict

Conclusion: Alkagesta drew Libertatea’s attention due to its “size” and “suspicious behavior”. If it had been a small company or provided transparent answers, its name would never have appeared in this article.

Read the full story: Companies that benefit from the conflict in Ukraine. How Romania became Kiev’s second-largest diesel exporter

ANALYSIS OF LIBERTATEA’S QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES:

1. ALKAGESTA – COMPLETE SILENCE:

Questions posed by Libertatea:

• About the origin of petroleum products
• Facts regarding exports to Ukraine
• Imports from the STAR refinery in Turkey
• Transparency of Malta operations

Alkagesta’s response: NO RESPONSE WHATSOEVER

The article clearly states: “Alkagesta appears in turn in the data from consulting firm NaftoRynok as exporting to Ukraine. Libertatea addressed questions to these companies regarding the source of petroleum products and exports to Ukraine, but so far they have not responded“

2. SOCAR PETROLEUM – COMPLETE SILENCE:

Libertatea’s questions:

• Facts about diesel supply to Ukraine
• Product procurement from STAR refinery
• Sales of fuels derived from Russian oil

SOCAR’s response: NO RESPONSE WHATSOEVER

The article states: “SOCAR Petroleum did not respond either. The company has a network of 60 gas stations in our country and also appears in statistics regarding Ukraine’s diesel imports”

3. LIST OF RESPONDERS VS NON-RESPONDERS:

NON-RESPONDERS:

1. Alkagesta – Maltese company

2. SOCAR Petroleum  – Azerbaijani company
3. Vitol  – Swiss trader
4. Euronova Energies  – Swiss group
5. Litasco  – Lukoil’s trader
6. MOL Romania – Hungarian company
7. Chimcomplex Borzești – Romanian company

RESPONDERS:

1. Oscar Downstream  – Romanian company
2. Oil Terminal  – State company

4. OSCAR DOWNSTREAM’S DETAILED RESPONSES:

Provided comprehensive answers to Libertatea’s questions:

Regarding Ukraine Exports:

“in OSCAR’s accounting there is no invoice for the sale of petroleum products to Ukraine… OSCAR Downstream has no business with any company in Ukraine and has not exported to Ukraine”

Russian-Origin Products:

“After February 5, 2023… OSCAR Downstream imported exclusively products from the world’s largest and most reputable oil producers and global traders, products that have always been of non-Russian origin”

STAR Refinery: “Oscar says it does not export to Ukraine and has not imported from SOCAR’s STAR refinery”

5. SYMBOLIC MEANING OF ALKAGESTA’S SILENCE:

Suspicious facts:

1. Appears in NaftoRynok data as exporter to Ukraine
2. Listed among Oil Terminal’s clients
3. Presented as Malta’s largest company
4. Connected to Grace Felix incident (not mentioned in article, but factual)

Reasons for silence strategy:

• Name mentioned in international investigations
• Suspected of sanctions violations
• Activity in Malta-Libya-Russia triangle
• Corporate transparency issues

6. REVEALING PATTERN:

Western companies (Oscar, Oil Terminal) – Transparent responses Eastern/Malta companies (Alkagesta, SOCAR, Vitol) – Complete silence

This “no response” strategy is not accidental. Alkagesta and SOCAR know that:

1. If they don’t tell the truth – they’ll be caught lying
2. If they lie – they’ll be confronted with documents
3. By staying silent, they maintain at least plausible deniability

Conclusion: In Libertatea’s investigation, the most suspicious behavior was shown by Alkagesta and SOCAR Petroleum. Their silence can itself be interpreted as an admission of guilt.

The LinkedIn video shows Alkagesta’s terminal in Malta and the M/V Blue Rose and Can Ka oil tanker. It highlights operations at the Malta terminal, including docking, loading, and unloading activities involving the Blue Rose oil tanker .

The footage provides a visual overview of Alkagesta’s operational capabilities and its use of the Blue Rose tanker.

Notably, the Blue Rose tanker has recently visited Novorossiysk, Russia, in addition to ports in Malta. While there is no confirmed evidence of sanctions or official ties to Russian state activities, these port calls could raise questions regarding the vessel’s commercial operations and potential connections to Russian shipments.

The M/V Blue Rose (IMO 9335915) tanker was built in 2007 and is currently operating under the Marshall Islands flag. Among its most recent port visits is Novorossiysk, Russia.

The vessel’s latest visit to the Novorossiysk port took place on September 13, 2025. This information is confirmed by real-time vessel tracking services. For example, VesselFinder reports that the vessel was expected to arrive at Novorossiysk on that date (VesselFinder).

These details indicate a direct connection between the Blue Rose tanker and Russia. However, there is no publicly available information regarding the cargo’s origin or final destination. Therefore, further investigation would be necessary to clarify the nature and purpose of the vessel’s connection with Russia.

The UK, EU, and US authorities must act swiftly to investigate Alkagesta’s ownership structure, sanction evasion practices, Russian corporate links, and its role in illicit oil smuggling from Libya and Russia.

Thoroughbred” horse

The database of HM Land, which registers property in England and Wales, contains a document stating that Adnan Ahmadzadeh purchased an apartment in London in February 2016 for 6.5 million pounds sterling (about 8 million dollars). We are talking about apartment number 409 at 20 Lanterns Way, Denison House, known to the British as Hamlet Tower. According to the document, the payment for the apartment was made through Hambros BANK LIMITED, registered in the Channel Islands in the south of England.

Adnan Ahmadzadeh’s cars

As can be seen from the documents, the first payment worth 5.5 million pounds sterling was made in Adnan Ahmadzadeh’s own name on April 26, 2018. This document reflects Adnan Ahmadzadeh’s residential address as Oceana Residence (Argean Building PH2) on Palm Jumeirah in Dubai. The price of a 3-room apartment in this residence ranges from 3.9 million dirhams to 7.7 million dirhams (from $ 1.1 million to $ 2.1 million).

By the way, Adnan Ahmadzadeh’s main business is located in the United Arab Emirates. The second payment of 550 thousand pounds sterling for the apartment in London was made on February 14, 2019 through the company Aa Properties 2000 Limited

AA PROPERTIES 2000 LTD was registered in London on December 4, 2015. Registration number 09903368, legal address is London, 32 Old Burlington Street. The founder of the company is Adnan Ahmadzadeh.

The company is engaged in the purchase of real estate. The head of SOCAR and head of SOCAR Trading also served as a director in a private company he founded until January 9, 2017. Since that date, the company has been headed by Nigar Karimli, born in 1994.

The Ahmadzades have another company in England. The London-based company PS ASSETS LIMITED was registered on October 2, 2013. Registration number 08715209, registered address Gallium House Unit 2, Station Court Borough Green Sevenoaks Kent.

The company is engaged in the purchase and sale of real estate. Among the shareholders of the company are Azerbaijanis Elmar Aghamaliyev and Togrul Rzayev (both employees of SOCAR Trading), as well as Corinthia Properties SA. This company is registered in Switzerland and is registered in the name of a woman named MIRZAJANOVA DILARA JAHANGIROVNA, born in 1976, registered at 18 Bulbul Avenue, Baku.

It should be noted that the daughters of AZAL President Jahangir Asgarov, Jamila and Malahat Asgarova, are also registered at this address. According to information added to the registry service on December 2, 2018, the value of the company’s shares amounted to 1 million 12 thousand 382 pounds sterling.

On April 6, 2016, Adnan Ahmadzadeh’s brother, Khayal Ahmadzadeh, born in 1977, and his father, Azer Ahmadzadeh, born in 1948, acquired the majority of the shares of this company, controlling 75 percent of the company.

Adnan Ahmadzadeh’s brother, Khayal Ahmadzadeh, is also represented in the management of SOCAR. He serves as vice president for business development at SOCAR-Trading, where his brother is president. One of the interesting nuances is that Khayal Ahmadzadeh’s registration address is the same as the address of Corinthia Properties SA, owned by Dilara Mirzajanova Jahangirovna, in Geneva.

SIMPLEMENTA2000 SL was registered in the Malaga Commercial Registry Office (Registro Mercantil de Málaga) on October 11, 2018, in the name of the head of SOCAR’s department. Registration number 410363, authorized capital is 3,006.00 euros.

Follow the next investigation into Adnan Ahmadzadeh’s brother Khayal Ahmadzadeh, who works at the Geneva office of Socar Trading SA

Timeline of Alkagesta’s Activities

• 2018 – Alkagesta Ltd incorporated in Malta. Immediately begins trading in high-risk oil shipments.
• 2019 (May 23) – Kamran Aghayev registers Caspian Oil and Gas Co. Ltd in Malta; filings show Alkagesta Holding as shareholder. Emin Rahimov appears as secretary.
• 2020–2021 – Expansion into Malta Freeport bunkering facilities and Turkish storage hubs.
• 2022 (Nov–Dec) – Customs records:
  • MT Tony (2.48m liters) and MT Istra (3.27m liters) declare Malta as loading port, but invoices state Turkmenistan origin. No valid survey reports.
  • MT Tony (Dec 10) again unloads in Gebze with contradictory documentation.
• 2022 (late) – Albania accuses Alkagesta of smuggling 22,500 tons of Russian oil.
• 2023 – Attempted delivery of Russian diesel into Spain blocked by customs for falsified origin documents.
• 2023–2024 – UN and Lloyd’s List identify Benghazi, Libya as key loading point for oil later declared as “Turkmen origin.” Alkagesta named in UN Panel of Experts reporting.

 Corporate & Network Links

 Key Findings

1. Legitimate vs Illicit Routes
   • Turkmen & Kazakh crude is lawfully exported via BTC pipeline under SOCAR Trading contracts.
   • Alkagesta, however, falsified documents, declaring Libyan/Russian oil as “Turkmen origin” to enter Turkish and EU markets.
2. Beneficial Ownership
   • Although not officially listed, Adnan Ahmadzade is the real controller of Alkagesta.
   • His cousin Kamran Aghayev serves as CEO.
   • Ahmadzade’s unexplained wealth (UK/Dubai properties, luxury cars) far exceeds his official SOCAR salary (~£400/month).
3. Sanctions Evasion
   • Multiple shipments through Malta involved contradictory declarations.
   • Use of sanctioned vessels like MT Istra indicates complicity with Russia’s shadow fleet.
   • Partnerships with Tatneft and Sibur deepen ties to sanctioned Russian energy giants.
4. Urgent Call for Action
   • UK & EU authorities must audit Ahmadzade’s assets, bank accounts, and company ties.
   • OFAC, EU, and UK regulators should list Alkagesta Ltd, Ahmadzade, and affiliates under sanctions.
   • Financial institutions should freeze suspicious transactions linked to these networks.

 Conclusion

The BTC pipeline provides a transparent, lawful route for Central Asian crude into Europe and Turkey. Alkagesta’s activities undermine this system by laundering Libyan and Russian-origin fuels into global markets under false Turkmen certificates.

This is not only fraud but a direct violation of UN and EU sanctions regimes.

The evidence clearly shows:

• Alkagesta is controlled by Adnan Ahmadzade, ex-SOCAR official.
• It is structurally tied to Caspian Oil & Gas, with global offices and Russian partnerships.
• Its practices are consistent with the dark fleet and illicit energy networks financing Russia’s conflict economy.

 Western authorities must act decisively: investigate, sanction, and dismantle Alkagesta’s operations before they further destabilize energy security and sanctions enforcement.

This analysis is based on open-source intelligence, public records, and documented sanctions violations. All allegations require formal investigation by appropriate authorities.